ABSTRACT: This paper chooses the data of the companies of A-share on main-board market, the SME board market and the growth enterprise market in Shenzhen and Shanghai SE from 2011 to 2015, and it uses the regression analysis method to study the effectiveness of the equity incentive in order to provide the listed companies with better suggestions of the equity incentive. The results show that there is a weak negative correlation between the executive holdings and the corporate performance, and three board markets have the same results, so the effectiveness of the equity incentive is not satisfactory. Besides, except that the sustainable growth rate and the share concentration have significant positive correlation with the company performances, there is no significant positive correlation or negative correlation between the other factors and the company performances.
INTRODUCTION
The main-board market, the SME board market and the growth enterprise market (GEM) are the important parts of Chinese capital market system, and the development of their listed companies has an important impact on China's economic development. As a long-term incentive method, equity incentive can reduce agency costs and promote the company performance, which has been effectively applied in western countries. It is worthwhile for us to discuss whether the equity incentive implemented by the Chinese listed companies can promote the companies' development and improve their performance, and whether there is any difference in the effectiveness of the equity incentive of the companies on the three board markets. In the past, empirical research on equity incentive mostly focused on companies on the main board, while there is very little research about the companies on the SME and the GEM board, although the number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in China is numerous. By April 6, 2017 , the total number of listed companies on Shanghai SE is 1249, that on Shenzhen SE is 1940, and the listed companies on the SME board and the GEM accounted for 46% of the total listed companies. Hence, the equity incentive of listed companies on the SME board and the GEM cannot be ignored.
Since the listed companies on the three board markets have differences on the scale, growth and other aspects, it is necessary to divide them into three board markets, which can better find the problems of equity incentive. This paper divides the A-share listed companies into the main board, the SME and the GEM instead of only focusing on the whole A-share listed companies or companies on a certain board market as before, to carry on the comparative study, and discusses whether the implementation of equity incentive have differences in the three board markets, so as to provide more targeted recommendations for the companies.
LITERATURE REVIEWS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUITY INCENTIVE
Now scholars at home and abroad estimate effectiveness of equity incentive through the proportion between executive holdings and company performance, and their conclusions can be divided into four categories:
Firstly, the equity incentive is conducive to improving the company performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the "benefit aggregation hypothesis", that is, equity incentive can reduce agency costs and improve the value of company. Jianbo Zhou and Jusheng Sun (2003) found that there is a preference for the choice of equity incentive for those companies with better performance.
Secondly, equity incentives are not conducive to improving the company performance. Deangelo (1986) discovered that management holdings would have a managerial defensive effect, which weaken external oversight forces, and reduce business efficiency. Ying Liu, Zenglian and Zhang (2015) thought that under the restrictive equity incentive mode, the level of incentive and the comprehensive performance of company are negatively correlated.
Thirdly, equity incentives and company performance show a range of effect. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) thought that there is a range of effect between equity incentive and company performance, and the research of Xiaohua Huang (2004) also confirmed it.
Fourthly, the implementation of equity incentives has no significant impact on company performance. Loderer and Martin (1997) used the simultaneous equations model to discover the negligible relationship between management holdings and company performance. Yue Zou (2010) found that equity incentive in different industries have no significant impact on the company performance.
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUITY INCENTIVE

Sample selection and data sources
The data come from A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai SE from 2011 to 2015, which excludes: (1) companies of ST and PT; (2) companies with discontinuous or incomplete data in five years; (3) companies who cancelled the equity incentive program after implementing. The numbers of the final selected companies on the main board, SME board, GEM to implement the equity incentive were 37, 77, and 51. The empirical data come from CSMAR and the official websites of Shenzhen and Shanghai SE, and the Stata14.0 statistical analysis software is used. β is the correlation coefficient of variables, i is the sample company, t is the year, and ε is the residual term. The Model 1 examines the linear relationship between executive holdings and company performance. When the executive holding coefficient β 8 is positive, the effect of equity incentive is positive; otherwise it is not ideal. Model 2 and Model 3 examine whether there is a non-linear relationship between executive holdings and company performance. Model 4 is the effect of implementing equity incentive after considering the influence of large shareholders on executives. The mean ROE of companies on main board implementing equity incentive is 0.1205, the standard deviation is 0.1095, the maximum value is 0.5020, and the minimum value is -0.5638, which indicate that the ROE of companies on main board implementing equity incentive is much different. The mean ROE of companies on SME board implementing equity incentive is 0.0762, the standard deviation is 0.2249, the maximum value is 0.7108, and the minimum value is -2.6279, which indicate that the ROE of companies on SME implementing equity incentive is relatively discrete. The mean ROE of companies on GEM implementing equity incentive is 0.0841, the standard deviation is 0.0659, the maximum value is 0.3998, and the minimum value is -0.1768, which illustrate that the ROE of companies on GEM implementing equity incentive is relatively low.
Descriptive statistics
Correlation analysis
As the paper space is limited, the correlation coefficient table is omitted. The absolute values of the correlation coefficient on the main board, SME board and GEM between respective variables are 0.2880, 0.1941, 0.3255, while the correlation coefficients between the independent variables on the three boards are within 0.33, and the correlation is small. Hence, there is no multi-collinearity between the variables.
Regression analysis
All regression analyses are performed to eliminate heteroskedasticity, sequence autocorrelation, and cross-sectional correlation effects, and its significant examination is at 5% level. According to the results of the regression analysis (See Table 3 ), the F values of the four models are both 0.0000, so the regression equation is significant at the 5% level, and all equations pass the test. The goodness of the four models is about 87%, so there is not much difference, and the interpretation ability is very good. Since many factors can affect the performance of listed companies, this paper only selected eight influencing factors, so it can be considered that the selected variables explain the explained variable to a certain extent. There is no significant difference in the correlation coefficient of each of the independent variables in the four models on the main board. In the four models of the main board, executive holdings and the company performance showed no significant negative correlation, indicating that the implementation of the equity incentive is not ideal. Sustainable growth rate has the strongest correlation with the company performance and the coefficient is 0.92, which indicates that the development capacity has great effects on the company performance. Next is the concentration of ownership, the largest correlation coefficient is 0.1327 in model 3, and the smallest value is 0.0999 in Model 4, which indicate that the concentration of ownership and the company performance is positively related. This may be because the degree of ownership is highly conducive to improving the efficiency of decision-making, which can let company seize the development opportunities and improve the company performance.
In addition, the variables which are positively related to the company performance are independent of the board of directors, the size of the board of supervisors, the comprehensive leverage and equity balance, but the correlation coefficient is small, and the correlation weakens successively, which indicate that the independent directors and board of supervisors of companies implementing equity incentive on the main board do not play a significant role in the improvement of the company performance. Integrated leverage represents the level of business risk, and the correlation coefficient of the relative leverage is 0.002, demonstrating that on the main board the companies' risk level have almost no impact on their performance. In the four models, the biggest correlation coefficient of equity balance is 0.0010 and the minimum is 0.004, which also shows that the equity balance has no significant effect on company performance. The industry is negatively correlated with the company performance, but not statistically significant. According to the results of the regression analysis (See Table 4 ), the F values of the four models are both 0.0000, so the regression equation is significant at the 5% level, and all equations pass the test. The goodness of the four models is about 87.1%, and the interpretation ability is very good. There is no significant difference in the correlation coefficient of each of the independent variables in the four models on the SME board.
In the first three models of SME board, executive holdings have no significant negative correlation with company performance, which is consistent with conclusions of the main board, so it indicates that the equity incentive on SME board is not ideal. But when it adds the proportion of the top ten shareholders' holdings multiplying the proportion of managerial holdings in Model 4, the managerial holdings are positively related to the company performance, and the product term is negatively related to the company performance, which is different from the results of the main board.
Although the degree of correlation is not significant, to a certain extent, there is a conflict between large shareholders and executives on SME board, the more shares the large shareholders hold, the better the supervision role of executive equity incentive is, which is similar to Renjun Zhou and Kaijuan Gao's (2012) study of the conflict between the major shareholders and the managers in high-tech enterprises.
Sustainable growth rate has the strongest correlation with the company performance and the coefficient is 1.5, which is consistent with the results of the main board, and it indicates that the development capacity on SME board has greater effects on the company performance than on main board. This is because relative to companies on main board, those on SME board are more mature, with higher growth and development potential. Therefore, the relevance with the company performance is stronger.
Different from the result of the main board, independence of the board of directors and the company performance has a significant negative correlation on the SME board, and the correlation coefficient is -0.21 or so, indicating that the more independent the directors are, the more conducive the improvement of company performance on SME board is. On one hand, because the listed companies on SME board is not mature and haven't established good selection mechanisms, many independent directors were invited by the companies leadership or management who were called human directors, which result in unclear power and unknown responsibility, and many independent directors' professionalism or independence is not strong, who cannot really play their roles. The correlation coefficient of equity concentration is 0.0976 in Model 4 and is 0.0543 in Model 2, which indicates that the concentration of ownership is positively related to the performance of the company, and it is consistent with the conclusion of the main board.
In addition, the variables that are positively related to the company performance are the scale of the board of supervisors, the degree of equity balance and the integrated leverage, and the degree of correlation is weakened. However, the correlation coefficient is small, which means that independent directors and board of supervisors in companies on SME board implementing equity incentive do not play a significant role, and have no impact on the improvement of the company performance. And the level of risk also has little impact on company performance, these conclusions and the results are the same as those of the main board. The industry is negatively correlated with the company performance, but not statistically significant. Table 5 . Regression analysis of GEM. According to the results of the regression analysis (See Table 5 ), the regression equation is significant at the 5% level. The goodness of the four models is about 84%, and the interpretation ability is very good. There is no significant difference in the correlation coefficient of each of the independent variables in the four models on GEM.
The proportion of executive holdings on GEM has passed a significant test in the Model 1 which has a weak negative correlation with the company performance. It shows that the equity incentive is not satisfactory on the GEM. The higher the proportion of executive holdings is, the lower the company performance is. The Model 4 takes into account the role of the major shareholders, while the proportion of executive holdings is negatively related to the company performance. The product term is positively related to the performance of the company, indicating that on the GEM, the major shareholders' supervisory to the equity incentive is not obvious, which is similar to the empirical results of the main board.
Sustainable growth rate has the strongest correlation with the company performance and the coefficient is 0.98, which indicates that the development capacity has great effects on the company performance, and it is consistent with the conclusions of main board and SME. The biggest correlation coefficient of equity concentration is 0.0852 in Model 3 and the smallest is 0.0812 in Model 2, which indicates that the concentration of ownership is positively correlated with the company performance, and it is also consistent with the conclusion of the main board and SME board.
Besides, the variables that are positively related to the company performance are the scale of the board of supervisors, the degree of equity balance and the integrated lever, and the degree of correlation is weakened, but the degree of relevance is not significant. The correlation coefficient of the integrated leverage is almost zero, indicating that the risk level has little effect on the company performance on the GEM. These conclusions are consistent with the results of the main board and SME board. Unlike the main board, the independence of the board of directors on the GEM is negatively correlated with the company performance, and the correlation coefficient is about -0.005 ~ -0.006, but compared with the SME, its significance is obviously weaker.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Through empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions:
(1) The company performance and the proportion of executive holdings have a little correlation on the main board, SME board and GEM, while there is a weak negative correlation between the company performance and the proportion of executive holdings. The implementation of equity incentive for improving the company performance is not significant. The higher proportion of executive holdings may be detrimental to the improvement of company performance. On the main board and the GEM, the major shareholders' supervision to the equity incentive is not obvious, but on the SME board the major shareholders play a certain supervisory role to equity incentive.
(2) Sustainable growth in the three boards are related to the company performance, and is the strongest correlation among all factors, and the results on the main board and the GEM is almost the same, but the result on SME board is better than the other two. It indicates that the development of enterprises plays a very important role in improving company performance.
(3) Ownership concentration in the three boards are positively related to the company performance, the most relevant is the main board, followed by the GEM, and the least relevant is the SME board. All boards passed the significant tests, indicating that the more concentrated the equity, the better the company performance in implementing incentive equity in China's listed companies.
(4) There is no significant positive correlation between the independence of the board of directors and the company performance on the main board. The independence of the board of directors is negatively correlated with the company performance on the SME board and GEM, but the negative correlation is significant on SME board, which is not obvious on GEM. It shows that on the three boards the independence of board of directors has not played its due role, especially companies on SME board, the independent directors is very conducive to the improvement of company performance.
(5) On three boards, the size of the board of supervisors, the degree of equity balance, and the overall leverage are all positively related to the company performance, but the industry is negatively related to the company performance, and the degree is not significant. In summary, the implementation of equity incentive of the companies on the main board, SME and GEM is not ideal from 2011 to 2015. As the size, the growth and other characteristics of each board are different, so the results of each board have some differences in different models and factors.
Meanwhile, this paper puts forward the following suggestions on the implementation and development of the equity incentive of listed companies in China:
(1) Compared with developed the capital market in western countries, Chinese capital market is underdeveloped, and the proportion of the executives is negatively correlated with the company performance in the listed companies, and the result is not very consistent with the general law of development, so our country should improve the capital market to provide a good external environment for the implementation of equity incentive for listed companies.
(2) From the empirical part, we can see that the sustainable development ability of the three boards is positively correlated with the company performance, and the companies' development ability has an important effect on improving the company performance. So, listed companies should pay attention to their companies' sustainable development, and try to improve the innovation ability so as to provide power for improving enterprises' performance.
(3) Listed companies, especially those on the SME board, should optimize the internal governance structure of enterprises, improve the selection mechanism of independent directors, maintain the independence of independent directors, and improve their professional level, so that the independent directors play their due role. What's more, the board of supervisors should effectively play the supervisory role, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders, and improve the company performance.
(4) Listed companies who has been implemented or prepare to implement the equity incentive should establish and improve the equity incentive system, develop strict incentive standards, and supervision and management evaluation system, so that equity incentive can really stimulate the enthusiasm of executives to make it be consistent with the shareholder objectives, thereby enhancing the company performance.
Equity incentive, as a long-term incentive mechanism, has been well applied in western countries, but it needs the improvement of the external environment and the internal efforts of companies to make full use of it in our country at this period.
